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It has been a great privilege to have been drawn into Bob Cover's world
on several occasions. Just a little more than a year ago, we were part of a
seminar studying questions of Community, Citizenship, and Jewish Law
in Jerusalem. Yet it was as a legal historian that I felt the greatest con-
nection to Bob. His Justice Accused' was a remarkable inspiration to
those of use who have felt the chasm between law and justice in American
law schools and have been aware of the ways in which positivism in phi-
losophy and history has legitimated this separation through a pseudo-
scientific understanding of the human condition. By highlighting the con-
nection between his own anti-Vietnam War convictions and his study of
the moral and psychological dilemmas of anti-slavery judges, he turned
history into complex questions of moral responsibility, not capable of be-
ing evaded by the restrictive definitions of professional role that both law
professors and historians regularly bring to their tasks.
Anglo-American legal history has remained divorced from questions of
legal and political theory. Just as Anglo-American legal theory since Ben-
tham and Austin has been notoriously ahistorical-encouraging each gen-
eration of theorists to search anew for universal truth untempered by the
need to account for historical variation and contingency-so too Anglo-
American legal history has been persistently untheoretical. Legal histori-
ans unfortunately have associated objectivity with a brand of untheoretical
antiquarianism. Yet, since political and legal theory are intimately in-
volved in issues of legitimation of the way things are, and of how we got
to where we are, they inevitably draw legal history into the debate over
how we arrived at the present and whether there are "lessons" that can be
learned from the past. Many of the interpretive issues in legal history
implicitly raise questions similar to those in legal and political theory:
whether there is a pattern of conflict versus consensus, continuity versus
discontinuity, and whether the way things are is the way they had to be.
Many of the great legal historians never explicitly addressed the theo-
retical issues to which their work was linked. Only after three quarters of
a century do we see clearly that Maitland's inquiry into early feudal
forms of property was intimately related to the then raging theoretical
t Charles Warren Professor of American Legal History, Harvard University Law School.
1. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975).
1825
The Yale Law Journal
debate about Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Maitland's legal history
was closely tied to a defense of Liberal individualism against collectivists
on both Left and Right, who claimed that status-based, pre-modern forms
of property had been spared from the influences of atomistic individual-
ism. But for some reason he never wished to let us in on the secret.
Only many years later does one appreciate that Paul Samuel Reinsch's
Thesis, that American colonial law substantially broke from the English
common law tradition,' was an application of the Frontier Thesis of his
mentor, Frederick Jackson Turner.4 Turner's Frontier Thesis favored en-
vironmental determinism over widely shared conceptions of an Anglo-
Saxon national character5 as the motive force of historical development,
and it presented American history as a sharp break with the past, not as a
gradual social Darwinist evolution. Since Turner and his disciples re-
garded Eastern cultural hegemony as based on Eastern claims to be the
direct heirs to a stratified English culture, it is not surprising that they
should have insisted that American democratic law broke decisively with
English ways.' However, Reinsch also implicitly attacked the conservative
Anglophilic content of the Langdellian method, its belief that the life of
the law has been logic, and its evolutionist theory of the common law.'
Yet, though much ink was spilled over whether the seventeenth century
pleadings in Massachusetts and the King's Bench were the same or differ-
ent, no one stopped to ask what was at stake in proving or disproving the
Reinsch Thesis.
2. I. VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 147-48 (1920); Sugarman &
Rubin, Towards a New History of Law and Material Society in England 1750-1914, in LAW,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1750-1914: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 28-30 (D.
Sugarman & G. Rubin eds. 1984); see C. FIFOOT, FREDERIC WILHELM MAITLAND 231-39 (1971);
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173,
179-80 (1985); White & Vann, The Invention of English Individualism: Alan MacFarlane and the
Modernization of Pre-Modern England, 8 Soc. HIST. 345, 352-54 (1983).
3. See Reinsch, English Common Law in the Early American Colonies, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367 (1907); see also Chafee, Colonial Courts and the Common
Law, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 53, 64-65, 72-76, 78-79 (D. Flaherty
ed. 1969) (discussing Reinsch thesis); Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century
New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 448 (1931) (arguing that "frontier theory ... gave us legal
institutions which the common law never succeeded in smothering").
4. See F. TURNER, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in THE FRONTIER IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 1-38 (1920).
5. See R. BILLINGTON, FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER 108-31 (1973); see also Horwitz, Progres-
sive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L. REV. 679, 679 (1984) (discussing Turner's equation of open
frontier with values of "democratic individualism").
6. See R. BILLINGTON, supra note 5, at 108-31.
7. For a reconstruction of the premises of the Langdellian system, see Grey, Langdell's Ortho-
doxy, 45 U. PrrT. L. REV. 1 (1983).
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I. LOCHNER AND THE SUBSTANCE-PROCEDURE DISTINCTION
The debate over the character of American constitutional jurisprudence
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-the period of the so-
called Lochner Court'-dramatically illustrates the way in which argu-
ments in legal history serve as proxies for more general controversies in
legal and political theory. To a surprising extent, the picture we have of
the Court between 1880 and 1937 is the product of winners' history.
There is no more widely accepted dogma in American constitutional his-
tory than that Lochner resulted from the late nineteenth century Supreme
Court's radical reversal of American constitutional premises., According
to the conventional position, the Court maintained a continuity of view
until the 1880's. The decisions of the Lochner Court were said to depart
abruptly from the heretofore consistently followed norms of constitutional
decisionmaking.
In retrospect, however, there is an astonishing continuity in the Su-
preme Court's underlying vision during its first 150 years. The substan-
tive due process of the Lochner era seems more like an extension of John
Marshall's contracts clause jurisprudence 0 and antebellum state court de-
cisions under takings clauses" than some sharp discontinuity in constitu-
tional ideology. Far from being an anomaly, the creation of anti-
redistributive constitutional checks on legislatures has taken multifarious
paths in American constitutional law.
By viewing Lochner through the lens of the current debate over the
Republican or Liberal character of American constitutional thought, 2 we
8. For critical discussion of the Lochner era, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
427-55 (1978); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
937-43 (1973).
9. See, e.g., S. FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE 126-64 (1956); C.
JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS 85-93 (1954); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE
RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 209-21 (1976); B. TwISS, LAWYERS
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1962).
10. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Sturges v. Crownin-
shield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
11. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837); Beekman v. Saratoga & S.R.R.,
3 Paige Ch. 45, 57 (N.Y. Ch. 1831); Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 168 (N.Y.
Ch. 1816); Raleigh & G.R.R. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 451, 459-61 (1837).
12. For the classic recent works, see B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); J. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-
INTEREST AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1986); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOMENT (1975); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969);
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1986). The current state of the debate is surveyed in Appleby, Republicanism in Old and
New Contexts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. (3d s.) 20 (1986); Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited:
Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. (3d s.) 3 (1986);
Ross, The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed, in NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 116 (J. Higham & P. Conkin eds. 1979); Shalhope,
Republican and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. (3d s.) 334 (1982); Shalhope,
Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in Ameri-
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can focus more clearly on the nature of the holding in that case and on its
subsequent reinterpretation. An earlier generation interpreted the post-
bellum rise of laissez-faire and its incarnation in the Lochner decision as
fueled by a desire to let the free market trump protective governmental
regulation. 3 The revisionists see instead a continuation of the Jacksonian
Liberal vision of a neutral state that would prevent "the interests" from
using government to feather their own nests. 4 Justices Cooley and Miller
revealed their Jacksonian roots, for example, in the Municipal Bond
Cases,15 where they argued that the anti-laissez-faire position was being
used by the railroads to get a larger share of the pie."8 The Income Tax
Case of 1895,1' although framed in more technical constitutional terms,
ultimately expressed the view that any progressive (and hence redistribu-
tive) income tax was illegitimate.1 s But that view, I believe, has its deep
roots in the Liberal conception of a neutral state that first began to
emerge in early American constitutional history and was developed and
elaborated over the course of the nineteenth century."9
The late nineteenth century insistence on a neutral state that was,
above all, anti-redistributionist arose simultaneously out of a conservative
fear that the state might be used as a levelling device and a Progressive
fear that the state was becoming the instrument not only of the wealthy
and the powerful, but also of corrupt city political machines.
The rise of the Regulatory Welfare State in the twentieth century rep-
resented a fundamental assault on this widely shared constitutional ideal.
Convinced that a redistributionist state was both necessary and just in an
industrial society in which inequality and oppression were increasing,
twentieth century Progressives sought to delegitimate the anti-
redistributionist picture of the neutral state. In Europe, as Schumpeter
showed so brilliantly in his The History of Economic Analysis, the chal-
lenge to Liberalism's assumption of neutrality focused on questions of eco-
nomic policy: the progressive income tax in the English budget of 1911,
the gold standard versus governmental interference with the money sup-
can Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. (3d s.) 3 (1972).
13. See sources cited supra note 9.
14. See L. GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE 375-79 (1976).
15. See C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION & REUNION, 1864-1888, at 918-1116 (1971) (vol. 6 of
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States).
16. See Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985
Wisc. L. REv. 767, 790-94; Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and the Michigan Supreme Court:
1865-1885, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 97, 103-04, 110 (1966); McCurdy,Justice Field and the Juris-
prudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HisT. 970, 973, 993-94 (1975).
17. Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
18. See A. PAUL, supra note 9, at 185-220.
19. See Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meanings and Origin of
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985).
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ply, the tariff versus free market policy.2 ° All of these debates identified
neutrality with the "natural" self-executing market economy. But, as is so
typical in American history, here the central arena of controversy over the
Liberal idea of the neutral state was constitutional law. It was here that
Progressive historians and their New Deal successors challenged the Loch-
ner Court's assumption of neutrality.
If we look at how the arguments developed, we will see, I think, the
exact moment at which the meaning of the Lochner era was mystified and
misrepresented. There were, roughly speaking, two lines of attack, two
delegitimating strategies. The first was the argument that democracy re-
quired judicial restraint. Drawing on Thayer's'famous 1893 essay,21 the
Progressives argued not only that judicial review was undemocratic but
that the Lochner Court had departed from a well established historical
baseline of judicial restraint. Thousands of pages were written purporting
to demonstrate that, under the influence of either natural law22 or
mechanical jurisprudence,2" the Supreme Court had violated precedent,
converted procedural into substantive due process, and subverted the ideal
of judicial restraint.2"
The second line of attack focused not on questions of institutional legiti-
macy but on the substantive premises that lay behind the Liberal idea of a
neutral state. How could the free market conceptions that made freedom
of contract a constitutional ideal be defended in light of the vastly unequal
market power existing between unorganized labor and increasingly con-
centrated corporate capital? How could there be a coherent distinction
between the state and the market (or between public and private realms)
when cartelization was creating private economic power that made public
power pale in comparison? How could there be a vital, effective, flourish-
ing democracy, they asked, when prevailing constitutional doctrine legiti-
mated a society growing ever more unequal in wealth and power? 25
The first line of attack prevailed and was drawn into the mainstream of
constitutional discourse in its 1950's Legal Process-Neutral Principles
mode.26 This theory built on previously established assumptions of consti-
20. J. SCHUMPETER, THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 759-71 (1954).
21. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (1893).
22. See E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1929); C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW (1931).
23. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
24. L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932).
25. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Hale, Coercion and Dis-
tribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470 (1923); Pound, Liberty of Con-
tract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
26. For the classic statements of the legal process school, see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princi-
ples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process
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tutional historians that the Lochner Court represented some special aber-
ration which a more neutral constitutional theory could address and cor-
rect. 7 The procedural tack allowed New Deal thinkers to explain their
revolution opportunistically. It was represented not as the justifiable over-
throw of anachronistic nineteenth century Liberalism, whose conception of
an anti-redistributive state was incompatible with the moral and political
premises of a Regulatory Welfare State. Instead, it was portrayed as a
healthy and normal corrective to a Lochner Court that itself had strayed
from an historically neutral baseline of democracy and judicial restraint.
For the past fifty years, there has been a symbiotic relationship between
constitutional legitimation of the New Deal and delegitimation of the
Lochner Court.2
The delegitimating argument that the New Deal constitutional histori-
ans chose had clear strategic advantages. It is more difficult to justify a
constitutional revolution on substantive than on procedural grounds, easier
to claim that one is restoring the neutral and natural according to some
meta-historical baseline of neutrality. Wherever legitimacy is defined by
law, there will be a clear advantage to those who argue for continuity or
the restoration of continuity over discontinuity, and a benefit to those who
mask-both to themselves and others-the existence of any changes they
institute. It is more difficult to justify great changes as desirable than to
represent them as a return to some Golden Age.
Any powerful substantive vision of what made the change imperative,
however, is lost by such a form of justification. We have gradually lost
touch with the reasons why the idea of a neutral state was incoherent and
depended on unsupportable background assumptions about the relation-
ships between state and society, public and private law, freedom and coer-
cion, rights and duties. Some of our most prominent legal thinkers have
returned virtually unchallenged to Lochner Court assumptions,2 9 in part
because for almost fifty years constitutional historians have taught that the
dispute was over disembodied institutional ideas of legislative power and
judicial restraint, not over law as the embodiment of substantive visions of
the good society.30
(tent. ed. 1958), and for a criticism of that mode, see Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1152, 1183-87 (1985).
27. See S. FINE, supra note 9, at 162-64; B. Twiss, supra note 9, at 130-40; Pound, supra note
23, at 616.
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); Easterbrook, The Su-
preme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4
(1984).
30. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT (1980).
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II. REPUBLICANISM VERSUS LIBERALISM
The current debate over whether early American political and constitu-
tional thought is more aptly characterized as Republican or Liberal3"
promises to spark renewed consideration of the entire body of American
constitutional history. I believe there is an important line of development
between the Liberal ideal of a neutral, night-watchman state of Madison's
Tenth Federalist 2 and the ideas of neutrality that were most elaborately
expressed in the Classical legal thought of the Lochner era. Moreover, the
Republicanism-Liberalism schism in early American thought probably
continues along some of its axes into the present day.
What contemporary issues are at stake in the Republicanism-
Liberalism debate? Perhaps the best way to approach this question is
through a brief-and superficial-intellectual history of the dispute.
Bernard Bailyn, J.G.A. Pocok, and Gordon Wood are the names most
often associated with the resurgence of an emphasis on Republican politi-
cal thought.33 But even before them, Karl Polanyi stressed the normative
aspect of the thought of Adam Smith.' The recent publication of Smith's
Lectures on Jurisprudence35 strikingly confirms that, unlike that of his
successors, Smith's thought was rooted in a conception of political econ-
omy which started from not only a labor theory of value but, more impor-
tant, a self-consciously normative political culture that subordinated eco-
nomic to political ideas."6 The Lectures place Smith clearly in the great
line of Republican political sociologists from Montesquieu to Toc-
queville 7 But, even more important, they underline the late eighteenth
century Republican theory of law as constitutive, and creative, of political
culture.3 8 Smith explains the shift from feudal to liberal ideas of property
not as the unfolding of economic necessity, but as the self-conscious use of
law to perfect and improve society and human nature. No wonder that
Jefferson repeated over and over again that Smith was one of his intellec-
tual heroes.39
31. See sources cited supra note 12.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
33. See B. BAILYN, supra note 12; J.G.A. POCOCK, supra note 12; G. WOOD, supra note 12.
34. K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 111-12 (1944). This aspect of Smith's thought
has been brought forward by Garry Wills. G. WILLS, INVErNG AMERICA 102-03, 129-30, 209,
231-32, 254, 289 (1978).
35. A. SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (R. Meek, D. Raphael & P. Stein eds. 1978).
36. Id. at 464-72, 524-26.
37. For a thorough discussion of the links between the thought of Montesquieu and Tocqueville,
see I R. ARON, MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 188-90, 200-01, 204-05, 210, 230
(1965).
38. See Nedelski, Confining Democratic Politics: Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Constitu-
tion (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REv. 340, 350-51 (1982).
39. See, e.g., 16 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 449 (J. Boyd ed. 1961) ("In political
oeconomy [sic] I think Smith's wealth of nations [sic] the best book extant.").
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One issue in the Republicanism-Liberalism debate is the status of posi-
tivism, or the separation of facts and values. Beginning in the 1950's,
Straussians have been attacking both Marxism and Liberal instrumental-
ism from the Right. 0 J.G.A. Pocock's appeal to the tradition of civic vir-
tue resonates with these anti-positivist appeals to an Aristotelian commu-
nity; politics is not a superstructure or the battleground for atomized
individuals but an independently vital form of human fulfillment and de-
velopment.41 Similarly, Bernard Bailyn's work is primarily directed
against Beardianism in American history and, to the extent that Beard is
a stand-in for Marx, to the reductionist base-superstructure methodology
of orthodox European Marxism.42 By emphasizing ideological origins,
Bailyn insists on the autonomy of ideas and cultural traditions.43 And, like
Pocock, he provides a path out of instrumental social science's use of class
or interest group explanations of social change. If Bailyn's work has a
conservative spin because of his sense that revolutionary ideology bore a
distorted or pathological relationship to reality,44 Gordon Wood's great
book45 sought to relegitimate the Beardian social conflict model without
returning to its simple reductionist premises. Along with Pocock, Wood
was the first writer to see that Republicanism was a truly coherent politi-
cal alternative to Liberalism in American thought.
Liberalism has stood for a subjective theory of value, a conception of
individual self-interest as the only legitimate animating force in society, a
night-watchman state, and denial of any conception of an autonomous
public interest independent of the sum of individual interests. Republican-
ism has stood for the primacy of politics and the relative independence of
ideals of the good life from economic forces. It has emphasized the growth
and development of human personality in active political life. It has pro-
ceeded from some objective conception of the public interest and conceived
of a state that could legitimately promote virtue.46
When one asks who were the Liberals in 1789 and who were the
Republicans, however, the argument becomes endlessly complex. Only
40. See L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953).
41. See K. POLANYI, supra note 34; Pocock, Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A
Study of the Relations Between the Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of
Eighteenth-Century Social Thought, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL EcON-
OMY IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 235, 248-49 (I. Hont & M. Ignatieff eds. 1983).
42. See R. HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 443 (1968); Wood, Rhetoric and Re-
ality in the American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY Q. (3d s.) 3, 22 (1966).
43. B. BAILYN, supra note 12.
44. See B. BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON (1974).
45. See G. WOOD, supra note 12.
46. This Republican legal tradition is still in need of further elaboration, despite Kent Newmyer's
admirable work on Justice Story and Robert Gordon's still unpublished Holmes lectures at Harvard.
See R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY (1985); R. Gordon, Lawyers as The
American Aristocracy (Feb. 1985) (unpublished Holmes Lectures).
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ideal types can be identified, and even Hamilton and Jefferson will not
easily fit the Liberal or Republican models. These models capture only
implicit tendencies, at best immanent in the thought of any one person. If,
in 1720, attitudes towards commerce or property were fundamental in de-
fining the Republican-Liberal or Court Party-Country Party dichotomy,
these particular variables may have been relatively unimportant in 1800."7
If one of the decisive questions in 1787 was whether there could be Re-
publican government over a large territory, that question may have been
insignificant in England twenty years earlier or in America twenty years
later. In 1750, one's conception of law may have been relatively unimpor-
tant in defining the essence of Republicanism; in 1890, it may well have
been at the core of the tradition.
Regardless of their posture on political issues at any particular time,
both the Liberal and the Republican traditions have sought to appropriate
law to their visions. In the Liberal tradition, a neutral state with its neu-
tral law could provide the framework for a neutral market society. The
Republican synthesis, however, viewed law as having an affirmative role
in constituting a community. For example, as William Treanor has
shown, the surprising absence of just compensation clauses in post-
revolutionary state constitutions was based on powerful Republican com-
munitarian conceptions of property.48 The Republican communitarian
model absorbed and modified the then widely accepted feudal-common
law view that all property was held in trust for the king. Indeed, from this
perspective, the contract clause decisions of the Marshall Court represent
a significant shift; they are important in establishing a Liberal conception
of the relationship between state and individual.4'9 The Fifth Amendment
to the federal Constitution, moreover, represents a dramatic Liberal rever-
sal of the dominant conception of the relationship between the state and
individual property holdings. 50
In this light, the dissenting opinion of Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania
in Eakin v. Raub,51 opposing judicial review, becomes not some aberra-
tional democratic protest but part of a more deeply rooted Republican
conception of government; if the polity is not an arena of competing inter-
ests from which some individuals or interests need protection, but rather a
forum through which individuals constitute themselves and achieve a pub-
47. Pocock, Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth Century, 3 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HiST.
119 (1972).
48. Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985).
49. See cases cited supra note 10.
50. See, e.g., Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts 63, 66-67 (Pa. 1840); Case of the Philadelphia &
T.R.R., 6 Whart. 25, 46 (Pa. 1840).
51. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
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lic good, it is difficult to justify judicial override of legislative action. The
separation of powers and such oddities as the system of legislative review
of judgments, widespread in the New England states between 1800 and
1825,52 can also be seen as deriving from a Republican vision.
If the Liberal idea of law was that it was a necessary evil, the price that
individuals needed to pay for a reasonable degree of security, the Republi-
can vision of law was as normative and constitutive of culture, and as
potentially positive and emancipatory. Law could create structures that
enabled individuals and communities to fulfill their deepest aspirations.
The twentieth century creation of a dichotomy between natural law and
positive law has prevented us from capturing this Republican idea of law.
The attack by Progressives on classical legal thought misleadingly charged
late nineteenth century orthodoxy with a natural law position.5" The posi-
tivist position of many Progressives kept them from appreciating that
there were many normative elements built into legal categorization and
legal reasoning-a famous constitutional law example being the Doctrine
of Implied Limitations-that were not experienced as importing external
higher law principles into the body of law. 4
What is so striking about Holmesian legal positivism as expressed in
The Path of the Law55 is that it represents-at least at the explicit
level-a dramatic reversal of the ordinary normative conception of law
that has prevailed throughout most of American history. Holmes's pre-
positivist work, The Common Law, had shared the view held by many of
his contemporaries that the common law was an expression of custom
which itself had a normative and evolutionary character.56 As Robert
Cover demonstrated in Justice Accused, some anti-slavery judges were
able to conceive of law as incorporating normative ideals while at the
same time rejecting any appeal to higher law outside of the body of legal
principles.57
In my view, the stark jurisprudential dichotomy between natural law
and positive law is itself a twentieth century positivist creation that has
kept us from seeing the way in which all legal structures inevitably em-
body normative positions. When one creates a pyramidal and categorical
legal structure,58 -as late nineteenth century classical legal thought aspired
52. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Hamilton v. Hempsted, 3 Day 332
(Conn. 1809); Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396 (1814); Dupy v. Wickwire, 1 D. Chip. 237 (Vt. 1814).
53. See C. HAINES, supra note 22, at 347-49.
54. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 280-81; Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Consti-
tutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REv. 247 (1914).
55. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
56. See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5-6 (1963).
57. R. COVER, supra note 1, at 226-56.
58. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685,
1687-94 (1976).
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to do, one also becomes committed to deductive and formalistic legal rea-
soning. All legal questions become on-off questions, questions of kind. In
contrast, when one conceives of legal phenomena along a horizontal con-
tinuum, as Holmes eventually did,59 all legal questions become matters of
degree, not of kind, and legal reasoning emphasizes balancing tests and
trade-offs.
All legal systems have a legal architecture that categorizes and classifies
legal phenomena. And every system of legal architecture incorporates deep
into that structure a set of normative premises about the proper way to
talk about law. Whether there are distinctively Republican or distinctively
Liberal systems of legal architecture is a subject worthy of future scholar-
ship. But that endeavor will be impeded if we remain stuck with the for-
malistic distinction between natural law and positivism.
We must become more self-conscious about legal historiography and the
ways in which controversies over political and legal theory influence legal
historical inquiry. It is time for us to bridge the chasm between legal
theory and legal history.
59. See Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1871); Holmes,
The Theory of Torts, 7 Am,. L. REV. 652 (1873).
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